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Psychopathy is a personality disorder comprised of affective (superficial charm, 
callousness) and behavioral (impulsivity, risk-taking) deficits, along with deficits in 
interpersonal relations (manipulativeness, grandiosity). Because a majority of the 
research on psychopathic individuals has been restricted to incarcerated offenders, little is 
known about community psychopathy and the characteristics associated with it. The 
construct of impulsivity is considered a core behavioral feature of offender populations, 
but the relationship between community psychopathy and impulsivity has received 
limited empirical focus. The purpose of this study is to fill the gap in the literature by 
examining the relationship among between impulsivity, risk-taking, and psychopathy 
among community members. Eighty-nine participants were recruited using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk to complete the study. Using several behavioral and self-report 
measures, participants provided information related to their impulsivity, risk-taking, and 
psychopathy. Separate multiple regressions were used to analyze whether impulsivity 
moderates the relationship between psychopathy and risk-taking. Regression results 
revealed no moderation effect of impulsivity between psychopathy and risk-taking, but 
correlational analyses suggest the presence of a relationship between psychopathy and 
trait impulsivity. 
  1 
1: Psychopathy 
 Psychopathy is a widely studied personality disorder that includes traits like 
callousness, manipulativeness, impulsivity, and recklessness (Lee & Salekin, 2010), and 
it is considered by some researchers to be the most important clinical construct in the 
criminal justice system (Hemphill & Hare, 2004). Despite attempts to expand knowledge 
of the personality disorder, research has remained focused on incarcerated populations. 
The study of community psychopathy is just now beginning to gain traction as a domain 
in which psychopathy research can grow. Cleckley’s (1941) conceptualization of 
psychopathy was the basis of the modern conceptualization of the construct, and he lists 
16 characteristics that make up the prototypical psychopath, including superficial charm, 
lack of remorse, and poor judgment. Many of the characteristics are non-criminal in 
nature and instead focus on the affective characteristics of the prototypical psychopathic 
individual. 
 Despite the likeness to antisocial personality disorder (APD), psychopathy is a 
distinct construct rooted in core personality traits. APD is a clinical diagnosis in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.) (DSM-5; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013) linked to violations of social norms, disregard for safety, 
irresponsibility, and numerous other behavioral features. Estimates of APD in the 
population range from 0.2% and 3.3% using the diagnostic criteria offered by the DSM-5 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013), while the prevalence rate of psychopathy 
remains around 1% (Hare, 1999). Criticisms of APD have included over-reliance of 
criminality as criterion for the disorder (Crego & Widiger, 2014). 
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 Because psychopathy does not have a clinical basis like APD, it is assessed using 
measures like Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003). The PCL-R 
is the most widely used forensic assessment tool for the detection of psychopathy 
(DeMatteo et al., 2014). The most common interpretation of the PCL-R is based on the 
two-factor model, which taps into the interpersonal and behavioral aspects of the 
condition, respectively (Hare, 1991). Cleckley’s influence can be noted in PCL-R. 
Examples of the Factor 1 aspect include terms such as superficial charm and grandiose 
sense of self-worth, with Factor 2 features containing terms such as poor behavioral 
controls and parasitic lifestyle (Hare, 1991). Each of the 20 items is given a score from 0 
to 2 with the highest possible score as 40, and a score of 30 is typically considered the 
cut-off for psychopathy. 
 In recent years, it has become more acceptable to acknowledge psychopathy as a 
dimensional rather than categorical construct and the PCL-R has received criticism in that 
it arbitrarily assigns a label as “psychopath” or “non-psychopath” when it may be more 
appropriate to identify an individual on a spectrum from normalcy to full-blown 
psychopathy (Bjork, Chen, & Hommer, 2012). Despite criticisms, the PCL-R remained 
one of the most heavily used tools in forensic psychology by researchers and clinicians 
alike, and its introduction in U.S. courts has steadily been increasing in the years since its 
publication (DeMatteo et al., 2014). 
 Hare (1991) conceptualized Factor 1 and Factor 2 of the PCL-R to tap into two 
distinct subgroups, primary and secondary psychopathy. Primary psychopathy is closely 
related to the interpersonal traits of psychopathy, while items more closely linked to 
behavioral features reflect secondary psychopathy. Primary psychopathy is considered by 
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Karpman (1948) to be the only true form of psychopathy as the features are based in a 
lack of empathy, which is a highly distinguishing feature of psychopaths (Hare, 1991). 
On the contrary, secondary psychopaths exhibit higher anxiety and fear levels, and tend 
to display poor behavioral control (Karpman, 1948). However, psychopathy does not 
necessarily have to be either based on only primary or secondary psychopathy. 
Individuals can endorse features on both facets, but if they display more characteristics 
on one aspect, they are considered to be higher in either “primary” or “secondary” 
psychopathy. Based on the older classification system of psychopathy, the cut-off score 
of 30 on the PCL-R would help determine if someone was a psychopath or not. But with 
the more recent “dimensionality” construct of psychopathy, it has become more 
challenging to separate community psychopathic individuals into either primary or 
secondary psychopathy. Because the understanding of community psychopathy is also 
relatively new, there is no specific rule that individuals must endorse specific features of 
a particular factor in order to be considered psychopathic.  
 Continuing with the primary and secondary psychopathy subtypes, Hicks, 
Markon, Patrick, Krueger, and Newman (2004) identified subtypes of psychopathy in a 
criminal population, lending support to the notion of the two-factor model. Prior research 
conducted on psychopaths has been mostly limited to studying the condition in forensic 
samples, although there is growing research in community populations. Incarcerated 
individuals higher in primary psychopathy are more likely to be accurate when judging 
victim vulnerability according to gait (Book, Costello, & Camilleri, 2013). Forty-seven 
inmates viewed 12 videos of unsuspecting targets walking (8 women, 4 men) and rated 
them on 10-point scale measuring vulnerability. Participants who scored higher on Factor 
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1 on PCL-R were more accurate in judging victim vulnerability by looking at gait (Book 
et al., 2013).
1.1: Psychopathy and Neuropsychology 
 Various imaging studies have attempted to identify the basis of psychopathy in 
neurobiology. Psychopathy is not restricted to a single dysfunctional brain structure or 
network.  For instance, the orbitofrontal, ventromedial prefrontal, and cingulate cortices 
have all been implicated in the development of the disorder (Gao, Glenn, Schug, Yang, & 
Raine, 2009). More specifically, a structural brain imaging study by Yang and colleagues 
(2005) found that convicted psychopathic individuals had a 22.3% reduction in the 
volume of prefrontal gray matter, suggesting that on average incarcerated psychopaths 
had a substantially different prefrontal cortex than those who evaded arrest. Research on 
the amygdala has found that participants higher on psychopathy have a more blunted 
response during emotional moral decision-making tasks (Glenn, Raine, & Schug, 2009). 
Particularly, the joint dysfunction of the amygdala and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
contributes to the unique behavioral characteristics of the psychopath (Blair, 2008). 
 The relationship between psychopathy and executive functioning has also been 
empirically established. Hiatt, Schmitt, and Newman (2004) found that psychopathic 
offenders perform better than controls in two out of three Stroop tasks, which measure an 
individual’s ability to ignore (or succumb to the influence of) information that is 
unimportant or irrelevant to the task at hand (MacLeod, 1992). Since the psychopathic 
offenders were able to successfully ignore the peripheral information, this suggests that 
they are better able to “tune out” information that is not integrated with the relevant 
material and does not lead them to their goals (Hiatt, Schmitt, & Newman, 2004). 
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However, another study utilizing various neuropsychological paradigms has found that 
inmates with psychopathy performed worse than criminal controls on selective attention 
and executive function tasks (Pham, Vanderstukken, Philippot, & Vanderlinden, 2003). It 
must be noted that psychopathic individuals in Pham et al.’s (2003) study had lower 
psychopathy scores as measured by the PCL-R than participants in Hiatt, Schmitt, and 
Newman’s (2004) study. 
 An additional focus in psychopathy has been in psychophysiology. Different 
avenues of research in the field have been examined and generally indicate a significant 
difference between psychopaths and their non-psychopathic counterparts. One approach 
includes examining heart rate (HR) and electrodermal activity (EDA), which are 
considered the most popular measures of psychophysiology. HR is controlled by both 
sympathetic and parasympathetic autonomic nervous system activity (Lorber, 2004), 
whereas EDA is regulated only by sympathetic nervous system activity (Blascovich & 
Kelsey, 1990). A meta-analysis by Lorber (2004) found that psychopaths on average had 
lower baseline and reactive heart rates when exposed to aversive stimuli. This diminished 
autonomic reactivity strengthens the distinction between low and high psychopathic 
individuals and furthers the notion that psychopathy is comprised of distinct emotional 
and interpersonal deficits (characterized by a more blunted or flat response that non-
psychopathic individuals, which may be interpreted as either calm or non-caring) that are 
not better explained by any other psychiatric conditions. Additional evidence to support 
the above hypothesis arrives from Patrick, Bradley, and Lang’s (1993) study, in which it 
was reported that emotional attachment – and not criminality – is the feature most 
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strongly associated with the atypical startle response of psychopaths (i.e., an absence of 
the startle potentiation to negative stimuli). 
 Research on psychopathy with electroencephalography (EEG) has been less 
conclusive, with some studies finding a smaller P300 amplitude (Kiehl et al., 1999) while 
others find a larger amplitude in psychopathic individuals (Raine & Venables, 1988). 
P300 is an electrical potential that occurs when a person is experiencing novel stimuli, 
and it has been suggested that reduced or delayed P300 amplitudes indicate fewer 
attentional resources being allocated to the task at hand (Polich, 2003). The disparity in 
the cognitive research on psychopathy may be related to the hypothesis that reduced P300 
amplitudes reflect antisocial behaviors rather than interpersonal features of psychopathy 
(Hicks et al., 2007), which may provide some reasoning as to why no association has 
been found between P300 and psychopathy in numerous studies (Gao & Raine, 2009). 
Additionally, according to Gray's biopsychological theory of personality (Carver & 
White, 1994), both primary and secondary psychopathy are positively linked to the 
Behavioral Activation System (BAS). Individuals who are activated to a high degree of 
the BAS tend to be more sensitive to goal-oriented behaviors that end in reward rather 
being sensitive to avoiding behaviors that might result in punishment (Ross, Moltó, et al., 
2007). This fits well with the notion that a psychopathic individual experiences low trait 
anxiety and more often seeks out behaviors that are stimulating and rewarding. 
 Exploratory studies have been conducted to examine the relationship between 
hormones – particularly, cortisol and testosterone – and psychopathy. It has been 
hypothesized that low levels of cortisol and high levels of testosterone lead to a 
diminished sensitivity to punishment and increased sensitivity to reward, which may 
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contribute to the development of psychopathy (van Honk & Schutter, 2006). 
Behaviorally, a higher testosterone to cortisol ratio in the amygdala impairs the signals 
between it and the orbitofrontal and medial regions of the prefrontal cortex, which can 
result in a reduction of fear and an increase in the aggression of an individual (van Honk 
& Schutter, 2006). Though the research in the field of hormones requires expansion, it 
has offered an interesting and alternative explanation for the development of 
psychopathy.
1.2: Community Psychopathy 
 Previous findings lend credence to the notion that primary psychopathy is made 
up of interpersonal features that are not intrinsically associated with criminal behavior 
(Belmore & Quinsey, 1994). Primary psychopaths may be more selfish, manipulative, 
and superficially charming, but because these traits are not illegal, other people are much 
less likely to view these characteristics as part of an existing personality disorder. They 
are instead seen as more extreme variants of normal personality traits. Moreover, 
psychopathic traits in community populations are expected to be lower in severity as the 
individuals who express more extreme variants of the disorder are more likely to end up 
incarcerated. Indeed, using an undergraduate university sample as a proxy for community 
members, Levenson, Kiehl, and Fitzpatrick (1995) asked respondents to fill out the 
Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale and found that the majority of endorsed items 
rated as either “agree somewhat” or “disagree somewhat” rather than “agree strongly” or 
“disagree strongly,” which indicates that most respondents displayed only mild 
psychopathy. 
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 The differences in the sophistication between primary and secondary psychopathy 
have led some researchers to consider the primary psychopath to be more “successful” 
than his secondary counterpart. This “success” arrives from the notion that these 
individuals have not yet come into contact with the criminal justice system. Additionally, 
if these “successful” psychopathic individuals do participant in illegal activities, they are 
better able to hide them. Another idea of “success” is based upon the individual’s 
appropriate use of emotion even when incapable of fully understanding it. For example, 
some successful psychopathic individuals are able to avoid causing harm to others 
because they may be more adept at correcting their inability to interpret emotion, a 
mechanism that psychopathic individuals high in secondary psychopathy do not possess 
(Sifferd & Hirstein, 2013). Gao and Raine (2010) posited that successful psychopathic 
individuals have average or above-average decision-making and emotion-regulating 
capabilities, which prevents them from acting out aggressively. As this subset of 
psychopaths possesses greater skill in being able to avoid detection, they are also often 
referred to as community psychopaths. 
 Evidence to support this claim comes from a study conducted by DeMatteo, 
Heilbrun, and Marczyk (2006) in which community participants were found to have 
significantly higher Factor 1 than Factor 2 scores. As such, one plausible theory of 
community psychopathy is that some non-incarcerated psychopathic individuals are 
likely to be “lower” on psychopathy (particularly secondary psychopathy) than their 
incarcerated counterparts, as incarcerated individuals may exhibit higher levels of 
psychopathy in part due to the violent nature of imprisonment. This “lowered” 
psychopathy is reflected by a lower score, but does not explain whether the score arises 
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from displaying fewer features of psychopathy or if the features that are endorsed are of 
lower severity (i.e., answers are neutral instead of strongly agree/disagree). In addition to 
being able to avoid settings that may exacerbate the presence of psychopathy, 
psychopathic individuals in the community may be able to avoid engaging in criminal 
behavior due to their intelligence. Intelligence has been found to moderate the 
relationship between psychopathy and criminality, such that individuals who are high in 
psychopathy and high in intelligence endorsed less criminal activity (Wall, Sellbom, & 
Goodwin, 2013). 
 Machiavellianism, characterized by a lack of interpersonal affect in relationships, 
lack of concern with conventional morality, lack of acute psychopathology, and low 
ideological commitment, has been shown to be positively associated with primary 
psychopathy in a community sample (McHoskey, Worzel, & Szyarto, 1998). An 
additional unique feature of primary psychopaths is their narcissism (McHoskey et al., 
1998). Research also suggests that psychopathic individuals who are high in primary 
psychopathy display greater emotional deficits, but that their enhanced impulse control 
allows them to remain undetected (Ross, Benning, & Adams, 2007).  
 Conversely, Ross, Lutz, and Bailley (2004) postulated that secondary psychopaths 
are more likely to be plagued by poor organizational skills and distress and that they do 
not possess the skills to keep maladaptive traits and behaviors in check. Dean et al.’s 
(2013) study, in which results suggested that secondary psychopathy is linked to making 
risky choices even when presented with all the risk and reward outcomes, supports this 
hypothesis. Executive dysfunction is also associated with secondary psychopathy (Ross, 
Benning, & Adams, 2007). Secondary psychopathy appears to be more environmentally 
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based, which suggests that this subset of psychopathic individuals has a greater chance of 
recovery in therapy (Skeem, Poythress, Edens, Lilienfeld, & Cale, 2003). 
 Psychopathic individuals in the community do share a number of characteristics, 
one of which is possessing riskier driving attitudes than non-psychopaths (Lee & Salekin, 
2010). Further, Belmore and Quinsey (1994) found that participants higher in 
psychopathy (using a cut-off score of 18 on the PCL-R) played a higher number of 
standard playing cards in a computerized experiment than non-psychopaths but did not 
lose significant amounts of money doing so. Participants were shown either a face card 
(ace, king, queen, or jack) or a number card (from 2 to 10) and either gained or lost 
money, respectively, as the probability of winning decreased as they continued to play 
cards. They had the option to continue playing or stop and “collect” their winnings at any 
point (Belmore & Quinsey, 1994). This suggests that those higher on psychopathy overall 
may possess better adaptation and adjustment skills than low-psychopathy individuals, 
which lays in contradiction to an earlier characterization of “success” in psychopathy. 
The discrepancies among the available literature indicate a need to further study the 
constructs. This includes parsing out the differences in particular tasks and attributing 
them to either primary or secondary psychopathy. Lee and Salekin (2010) reported that 
both subgroups of psychopathy were more likely to engage in risky and criminal activity. 
However, despite these commonalities, the need for a more formal distinction in 
psychopathy is necessary as research indicates a clear distinction between the two 
subgroups in both their behaviors and attitudes. 
 As community-based psychopathic individuals lay between non-psychopaths and 
incarcerated psychopaths on the psychopathy continuum, the distinction between non-
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psychopaths and psychopathic individuals in the community is not as apparent as the one 
between non-psychopaths and incarcerated psychopaths. This is particularly true if the 
actions of the psychopathic individual are not seen as overtly negative or dangerous. If 
low emotionality presents itself as a callous and uncaring trait, that characteristic is less 
striking than that of an individual who is more hostile and aggressive. Therefore, the lines 
of expected variations in personality traits and psychopathy blur when referring to 
psychopathic tendencies that are based in primary psychopathy. However, although the 
differences may be smaller they are still able to make a noticeable impact in the social 
and/or occupational functioning of an individual. For example, community-based 
psychopathic individuals have also been referred to as “corporate” psychopaths if they 
are able to use their manipulative and conning skills to get ahead in the workplace 
(Boddy, 2013).
1.3: Corporate Psychopathy 
 An emerging field is that of corporate psychopathy, in which individuals with 
advantageous psychopathic characteristics are able to make calculated moves to advance 
in the workplace. Because those displaying corporate psychopathy are not engaging in 
criminally psychopathic behavior, the seemingly positive personality traits they possess 
may be characteristics employers seek. An in-depth analysis of the research conducted on 
corporate psychopaths revealed that the subset of psychopaths who work in white-collar 
positions and whose primary motivation is money-related is unique from the other types 
of psychopathy (Chiaburu, Muñoz, & Gardner, 2012). 
 These individuals are more likely to have characteristics that are closely tied to 
primary psychopathy, such as being egocentric, pathological liars, charming, conning, 
  12 
narcissistic, patronizing towards others, and having a sense of entitlement (Perri, 2013). 
Because they possess better cognitive functions, they are more easily able to deflect 
responsibility off their own actions. Rationalization plays a large role in how they are 
able to justify their behavior (Perri, 2013). Although workplace psychopathy may be 
beneficial in certain regards, it does not go unnoticed by employees who come into 
contact with this type of psychopathic individual (Boddy, 2011, 2013). In a preliminary 
study by Boddy (2013), white-collar employees took online surveys about their 
colleagues, revealing that employees who worked in the presence of a corporate 
psychopath display counterproductive work behaviors and intentionally decrease 
productivity due to an increase in the negative emotions felt by those in contact with the 
psychopathic individual. This brings forward the idea that even though psychopathic 
individuals may not physically harming those surrounding them, the behaviors they 
exhibit are upsetting to their colleagues. Thus, the effects of the psychopathic personality 
in the workplace may be more covert, but may indeed—at least preliminarily—reflect a 
“successful” type of psychopathy nonetheless. 
 Psychopathy in the workplace is a double-edged sword in that it may be adaptive 
in certain circumstances but harmful in others (Smith & Lilienfeld, 2013). Emotional 
intelligence is traditionally considered a prosocial trait; however, the “dark side” of 
emotional intelligence is the ability to emotionally manipulate other people (Grieve & 
Panebianco, 2013). An example of these manipulative tendencies exhibits itself in the 
fraudulent nature of psychopathic individuals, where to make gains in the workplace, 
they engage in behaviors that appear to endorse company development or corporation 
advancement but instead are false indicators of good workmanship (Chiaburu et al., 
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2012). They are also less likely to engage in social entrepreneurship, which is likely due 
in part to the lack of personal gain made by assisting in the community (Akhtar, 
Ahmetoglu, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2013).
2: Impulsivity 
 Impulsivity, generally defined as the inability to inhibit behavior when necessary 
or to delay gratification (Cherek et al., 1997), is a multi-faceted construct that has 
received a great deal of empirical attention. Clinical disorders that are traditionally 
associated with impulsivity include Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, substance 
use disorders, and Antisocial Personality Disorder (Dalley, Everitt, & Robbins, 2011). 
Although a considerable amount of research has been conducted on impulsivity, much of 
it in the forensic field has been limited to impulsive aggression as it is easy to measure 
(Moeller et al., 2001). 
 Because impulsivity presents in numerous ways, researchers have devised 
multiple ways to measure the construct. Generally, impulsivity is separated into three 
domains: impulsive action, impulsive choice, and reflection impulsivity. Impulsive 
action, also known as motor impulsivity, refers to the tendency to fail to withhold a motor 
response (Brevers et al., 2012) and is traditionally assessed using the Stop Signal Task 
(SST; Dalley et al., 2011). The Delay Discounting Task (DDT) is often utilized to 
measure impulsive choice or “cognitive impulsivity” (Dalley et al., 2011), which involves 
uncharacteristic levels of delay aversion (Brevers et al., 2012). Reflection impulsivity 
refers to the inability to collect and process information before making a decision and is 
evaluated using the Information Sampling Task (Lawrence, Luty, Bogdan, Sahakian, & 
Clark, 2009). However, the measurement of impulsivity is not restricted to only 
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behavioral tests. One of the most frequently utilized measures of impulsivity is the self-
report Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) developed by Patton, Stanford, and Barratt 
(1995). 
 Several studies investigating the role of impulsivity have discovered that different 
measures of impulsivity understandably measure different aspects of the construct. 
Studies evaluating multiple measures of impulsivity shown that the relationships between 
behavioral and self-report measures are weak (Broos et al., 2012; Franken & Muris, 
2005; Moeller et al., 2002; Vigil-Colet, 2007). This is important to note as it reflects 
difficulties for researchers to reach a consensus on the definition of impulsivity because it 
is not a unitary construct and rather made up of several separate underlying processes 
(Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards, & De Wit, 2006). Enticott and Ogloff (2006) prefer to 
define impulsivity as an outcome that is a result of numerous behavioral processes rather 
than as a construct, which is distinct from the definitions offered by most other 
researchers. An alternate explanation offered by Winstanley, Eagle, and Robbins (2006) 
suggests impulsivity can be separated into a set of behavioral subtypes that are 
anatomically different. 
 Behavioral measures like the DDT and SST are considered to tap into state 
impulsivity, while self-report measures such as the BIS-11 measure more trait-related 
aspects of impulsivity (Broos et al., 2012). There are advantages and drawbacks 
associated with both types of tools, as self-report measures rely on the veracity of the 
participant but allow researcher to gather data on long-term behaviors, while behavioral 
measures lack the long-term component but offer unbiased results as participants cannot 
lie on those tests (Moeller et al., 2001). It is crucial to capture data on the various forms 
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of impulsivity since it can manifest in a number of ways in individuals who display 
impulsive behaviors. Since multiple measures (e.g., the SST, DDT, and BIS-11) are able 
to capture the construct of impulsivity, it is important that researchers use as many tools 
as are available so that the separate components of impulsivity can be assessed 
individually. The best technique to assess for impulsivity is to use a multi-measure 
approach that includes utilizing multiple definitions of the construct and by also using the 
most valid and reliable tests that capture those different definitions. 
2.1: Impulsivity and Neuropsychology 
 Researchers have increased efforts to discover the etiology of impulsivity. In both 
human and rodent studies, it has been suggested that the nucleus accumbens plays a role 
in impulsivity, particularly in the domain of impulsive action (Basar et al., 2010). The 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is an additional region implicated in impulsive choice, though 
conflicting results have arisen from these studies. Some studies have reported that OFC 
lesions increase preference for the delayed reward in rodents (Winstanley et al., 2004). 
Others found that rat subjects instead were more likely to choose immediate and certain 
rewards (Mobini et al., 2002). 
 Impulsive action is considered to have a distinct neural basis from impulsive 
choice as its focus is on the inability to suppress an automatic response. The inferior 
frontal gyrus has been theorized to have some control over this particular form of 
impulsivity in humans (Aron et al., 2003), particularly in the right hemisphere (Garavan, 
Ross, & Stein, 1999). Some researchers go as far as to define a “stop circuit” in the brain 
that includes regions such as the right-hemisphere presupplementary motor area, inferior 
frontal gyrus, and a projection to the subthalamic nucleus that are involved in the Stop 
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Signal Task (Aron et al., 2007). This theory has been met with some controversy as the 
left frontal cortex does also show activation during the SST (Dalley et al., 2011). These 
findings suggest that there is a clear distinction between impulsive choice and impulsive 
action in terms of neuroanatomy and brain activation, and highlight the need to include 
both forms of impulsivity in terms of defining and measuring the construct.
2.2: Impulsivity and Psychopathy 
 Research suggests that a relationship between psychopathy, risk-taking, and 
impulsivity exists (Blackburn & Maybury, 1985; Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1990; 
Mitchell, Colledge, Leonard, & Blair, 2002). Although some researchers consider 
impulsivity and psychopathy to be the same construct (Blackburn & Coid, 1998; 
Blaszczynski, Steel, & McConaghy, 1997), other researchers urge that the constructs be 
separated as the relationship between psychopathy and impulsivity is not always present 
(Poythress & Hall, 2011). Results from LaPierre, Braun, and Hodgins’ (1995) study 
revealed that criminals high on psychopathy performed worse on neurocognitive tasks 
than criminal non-psychopaths. Researchers have also discovered that the distinction 
between primary and secondary psychopathy in incarcerated samples can be made   using 
impulsivity as a distinguishing factor (Ray et al., 2009).  
 An early study that examined the relationship between neuropsychological 
behavioral performance and psychopathy in a community sample found that the 
affective-interpersonal factor of psychopathy was positively associated with executive 
cognitive functioning, while the social deviance factor was negatively associated with it 
and response inhibition (Sellbom & Verona, 2007). Although the factor scores used by 
Sellbom and Verona (2007) do not fully break down in representing primary and 
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secondary psychopathy as do the factors of the PCL-R, there are enough similarities to 
suggest that there is a distinct neuropsychological difference between the two subgroups 
of psychopathy. A related study determined that primary psychopaths exhibited reduced 
impulsivity related to acting without thinking and planning for the future compared to 
secondary psychopathy. This suggests that impulsivity is not automatically raised in all 
psychopathic populations and when it is, it manifests itself in different situations 
according to the stronger subtype of psychopathy (Snowden & Gray, 2011). 
 A study by Hunt, Hopko, Bare, Lejuez, and Robinson (2005) examined the 
relationship between impulsivity and psychopathy in a non-forensic sample using the 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). Researchers found that there was a small 
correlation between the behavioral task and self-report impulsivity. Primary findings 
revealed that higher psychopathy scores significantly predicted increasing risk-taking on 
the BART (Hunt et al., 2005). Morgan, Gray, and Snowden (2011) conducted a similar 
study, looking at the relationship between psychopathy and impulsivity in a community 
sample. They reported that a correlation between the BIS-11 and psychopathy existed, 
but that behavioral measures were not correlated with psychopathy (Morgan et al., 2011). 
This current research is looking to determine if a relationship between psychopathy and 
impulsivity exists using multiple forms of measures of impulsivity (e.g., self-report, 
behavioral). Fowles and Dindo (2006) found that primary psychopathy-based individuals 
manifest the type of impulsivity in which they are willing to engage in risky activity even 
after taking the consequences of their actions into account.
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3: Risk-taking 
 Floden and colleagues (2008) indicate that parsing out behaviors that either 
belong to impulsivity or risk-taking is difficult because true operational definitions of 
both constructs have not yet been developed. However, it appears that the most striking 
difference between risk-taking and impulsivity is that impulsivity involves decisions 
made as a result of poor inhibition, while risk-taking involves appraising the available 
options and deciding to proceed with a risky choice (Floden et al., 2008). 
 Using the Risk Taking Task, Ernst et al. (2002) found that there is an existing 
decision-making neural network, and that different brain regions become activated when 
participants are guessing on items versus being actively involved in the decision-making 
process. This aids in distinguishing brain regions that are related to risk-taking, namely 
the orbital and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, insula, inferior parietal 
cortex, and thalamus (Ernst et al., 2002). Although a number of these regions have also 
been implicated in impulsivity, the distinct structures put forth as being active during the 
commission of an impulsive act in this study further aid to separate the two constructs. 
 Although the relationship between risk-taking and psychopathy is not as well 
researched as that between impulsivity and psychopathy, the research that has been 
conducted thus far offers differing results. Risk-taking as measured by the BART was not 
significantly associated with psychopathy in an offender sample (Swogger, Walsh, 
Lejuez, & Kosson, 2010). Interestingly, a study by Hunt and colleagues (2005) makes use 
of the BART but refers to the measure as relating to impulsivity rather than risk-taking. 
This example supports Floden et al.’s (2008) suggestion that the definitions of both risk-
taking and impulsivity lack a true empirical basis.
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4: Current Study 
 The current study examined the relationship between psychopathy and risk-taking 
with impulsivity as a moderating variable. As the tests that measure constructs such as 
impulsivity and risk-taking can overlap, this study makes a clear distinction as to which 
measure relates to which construct. It appears that no research has examined whether 
each subset of impulsivity moderates the relationship between psychopathy and risk-
taking in a community sample. Total psychopathy was used in these analyses rather than 
separating into primary and secondary psychopathy because it offers a more complete 
picture of how psychopathic traits are manifested in a community population. While 
studying the moderating effect of impulsivity on risk-taking and factors of psychopathy 
would offer a more distilled perspective of the condition, it would not reflect the study’s 
aim to understand community psychopathy as a whole. Another aspect that was examined 
is whether impulsive action or impulsive choice plays a greater role in risk-taking for this 
particular population. Traditionally, this domain of research is more cognitive based, so 
this study is novel in its attempts to merge cognitive and forensic psychological research. 
Because psychopathy research in non-forensic populations has only developed in recent 
years, there is a great deal more to learn about the subset of individuals who are below 
threshold for psychopathy according to measures like the PCL-R but may still exhibit 
characteristics of their incarcerated counterparts. 
 Furthering research in the domain of community psychopathy will help 
researchers better understand the construct and will aid in revealing more about those 
who primarily display non-criminal aspects of the personality disorder. Because there is a 
great deal of available literature on psychopathy in offender populations, this study has 
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the potential to help researchers better understand the similarities and differences 
between psychopathic individuals in the community and those who have been processed 
through the criminal justice system by offering novel information about psychopathic 
individuals in the community. If impulsivity contributes to the behavioral tendencies to 
commit crime, there may be a sizeable difference in impulsivity scores of incarcerated 
compared to non-incarcerated individuals, even if both types of individuals would be 
considered psychopathic according to their personality characteristics. Therefore, 
participants in this study may exhibit levels of impulsivity that are lower than their 
forensic counterparts, but are still higher than non-psychopathic individuals.
4.1: Hypotheses 
 Specific hypotheses included: 
(1) Impulsive choice will significantly moderate the relationship between 
psychopathy and risk-taking. 
(2) Impulsive action will significantly moderate the relationship between 
psychopathy and risk-taking. 
(3) Trait impulsivity will significantly moderate the relationship between 
psychopathy and risk-taking. 
(4) Risk-taking will be significantly predicted by participants’ age, gender, 
ethnicity, race, education level, employment status, impulsivity, and psychopathy. 
(5) There will be a positive correlation between impulsivity and secondary 
psychopathy. 
(6) Impulsive choice will account for more variance in risk-taking than impulsive 
action.
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5: Methods
5.1: Participants 
 One hundred and twenty five participants were recruited using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). A power analysis was calculated using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). A medium effect size was chosen as there are no 
effect sizes reported in the literature and is the effect size typically used in novel research 
approaches. Using a medium effect size (.25) and an alpha level of .05, the results 
suggested 109 participants are needed to obtain adequate statistical power (.80) for the 
stepwise regression. Despite this model not being the primary analysis for this study, this 
test requires the greatest number of participants and therefore was used to calculate the 
number of participants needed for all the analyses to reach adequate power. However, 
125 participants were recruited to account for those who do not successfully complete the 
measures on Mechanical Turk. Inclusion criteria included fluency in English and being 
between 18 and 45 years of age; the latter criterion was intended to limit any age-related 
decline in cognitive performance for the behavioral tasks. The only exclusion criterion 
included incarceration following a criminal conviction. As identifying information was 
not collected from participants and risk was minimal, we applied for a waiver of 
informed consent from Drexel’s Institutional Review Board.
5.2: Procedures 
 This study examined whether impulsivity moderates the relationship between 
psychopathy and risk-taking. Because MTurk is a website on which participants sign up, 
the sample was not truly random. Instead, participants who met qualifications for the 
study self-selected based on their interest. After participants consented to participate in 
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the study, they were directed to follow a hyperlink to self-administer the study on 
Qualtrics. Qualtrics has the ability to limit participants to only taking the study once. 
Additionally, participants were asked to create a unique password that they entered on 
both Qualtrics and MTurk upon completion of the study to receive compensation. 
 After following the hyperlink from MTurk to Qualtrics, participants completed a 
demographic questionnaire, and then completed the remaining measures in the order of 
most to least laborious and time-intensive. After concluding the demographic 
questionnaire, participants then completed the Stop Signal Task, Balloon Analogue Risk 
Task, and Delay Discounting Task, and then completed the Levenson Self-Report 
Psychopathy Scale and the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. Once data collection was 
completed, statistical analyses were conducted to assess the hypotheses.
5.3: Materials 
 5.3.1: Behavioral Measures 
 Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002). This is a computerized 
behavioral measure of risk-taking that uses realistic rewards to demonstrate actual risk-
taking. The BART is proprietary, programmed using the Inquisit Millisecond software 
package, and required no special permission to be used on MTurk. Fifteen balloons have 
to be inflated, one by one. Participants are given the option to either inflate the balloon 
(one inflation at a time) or collect the earnings from that balloon. Each successful 
inflation adds $0.05 to the total earnings in a temporary bank, but also increases the risk 
of the balloon popping. If a balloon pops, the potential earnings (the money in the 
temporary bank) from that balloon are lost. With each inflation, the risk of popping 
increases (1/128, 1/127, 1/126, etc.). The screen gives no information about when each 
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balloon would pop, and to proceed to the next balloon, “Collect $$$” has to be pressed. 
“Collect $$$” is only offered as an option if participants inflate the balloon at least once, 
and once it is chosen, the money is moved from the temporary bank to the permanent 
bank. Once participants have collected money from a particular balloon, there is no 
option to return to previous balloons. Participants do not receive compensation in the 
amount they earn during the session. Adjusted average pumps, calculated based on the 
average number of balloon pumps for balloons that do not explode, was used as the 
primary dependent measure. There are no norms for risk-taking behaviors in the BART. 
It has an acceptable test-retest reliability for the adjusted average pumps variable (r = 
0.77; White, Lejuez, & de Wit, 2008). 
 Stop Signal Task (SST; Verbruggen, Logan, & Stevens, 2008). This is a non-
proprietary computer-administered, behavioral measure of impulsive action programmed 
using the Inquisit Millisecond software package. It required no special permission to be 
used on MTurk. There are four blocks during this task: one practice block consisting of 
32 trials, and three separate blocks of 32 trials. There is a 10-second break between each 
block. On each trial, participants see on the screen either an arrow pointing to the left or 
an arrow pointing to the right. There is a 2,000 millisecond break between each trial. 
Their task is to respond as fast and accurate as possible to these go stimuli, which 
involves pressing the “D” key with the left index finger when the arrow is pointing to the 
left and pressing the 'K' key with the right index finger when the arrow is pointing to the 
right. The stimulus remains on the screen until participants respond or 1,250 milliseconds 
pass.  On occasion, the stimulus (i.e., arrow pointing either left or right) is followed by a 
sound, indicating that participants should inhibit their response on that trial. Participants 
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begin the stop-signal trials with 250 milliseconds in between the stimulus and 
presentation of the stop signal. If participants successfully inhibit their responses, the 
delay increases by 50 milliseconds; if they are unsuccessful, the delay decreases by 50 
milliseconds. If participants wait for a stop signal to occur, the computer delays 
presenting the stop signals. The mean stop signal reaction time in stop signal trials was 
examined. There are no norms for action-based impulsivity with the SST. 
 Delay Discounting Task (DDT; Cherek et al., 1997). This is a behaviorally based 
laboratory task used to assess impulsive choice. Participants are given two response 
options on a computer screen: an impulsive response option (shown as “A” onscreen) and 
a self-control response option (shown as “B” onscreen) in two separate blocks. One is a 
training block that contains 10 trials to familiarize participants with the procedure, and 
then the other block with thirty trials is administered. During the first half of the training 
session, participants are shown five separate trials where the letter A is presented 
onscreen and the participant is instructed to click on the “A” when it begins to flash after 
5 seconds. After correctly clicking on “A”, the letter disappears and $0.05 is added to a 
permanent bank. During the second half of the training session, participants are presented 
with the letter B onscreen and instructed to click on “B” when it begins to flash after 15 
seconds. After correctly clicking on “B”, the letter disappears and $0.15 is added to a 
permanent bank. This training session exposes participants to the different monetary 
amounts and delays associated with “A” and “B” letters. 
 During the second block, both the “A” and “B” letters appear on the screen at the 
beginning of each of the 30 trials. Participants are now given an option to choose either 
“A” or “B”; once they choose a letter, the other disappears. After either a 5- or 15-second 
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delay, the remaining letter begins to flash, and a second click on it adds $0.05 or $0.15 to 
a permanent bank depending on the chosen letter. The letter choice in the previous trial 
determines how the subsequent timing of the “B” choice is administered. Each time 
participants choose “B,” the next delay for that letter increases by 2 seconds. The 
opposite also holds true; a choice of “A” decreases the delay by 2 seconds. For example, 
if a participant selects the “B” option after waiting 15 seconds, the subsequent selection 
of the “B” option would require waiting 17 seconds in order for money to be deposited 
into the permanent bank. The delay for option “B” is never less than 7 seconds, and 
therefore is never equal to or less than impulsive response option “A”. Participants did 
not receive compensation in the amount they earned during the session. The variable of 
interest was the percent of impulsive choices participants made only in the second block. 
Participants were considered impulsive if greater than 50% of their choices were 
impulsive. 
 5.3.2: Self-Report Measures 
 Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP; Levenson et al., 1995). This is a 
26-item self-report instrument used to measure psychopathy in non-incarcerated 
populations. It is non-proprietary, programmed using the Inquisit Millisecond software 
package, and required no special permission to be used on MTurk. The LSRP has two 
subscales, primary and secondary. The primary subscale is comprised of 16 items that are 
primarily personality-based, while the secondary subscale is comprised of 10 items 
focusing more on antisocial behaviors. The LSRP yields the primary psychopathy score 
and the secondary psychopathy score, which combine to yield the Total score. The Total 
score, which could have been a maximum of 104, was used for most analyses in this 
  26 
study. Each item is rated on a 4-point Likert scale, with the following choices: “agree 
strongly,” “agree somewhat,” “disagree somewhat,” and “disagree strongly.” The LSRP 
has demonstrated good internal consistency for the total score (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82) 
and both subscales (primary subscale Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83, secondary subscale 
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.71; Falkenbach, Poythress, Falki, & Manchak, 2007). 
 Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton et al., 1995). This is a widely used 
self-report questionnaire composed of 30 items, some of which are reverse-scored, that 
measures trait-like impulsive behaviors and preferences. It is non-proprietary, 
programmed using the Inquisit Millisecond software package, and required no special 
permission to be used on MTurk. Items are scored on a 4-point Likert scale, with 1 = 
rarely/never, 2 = occasionally, 3 = often, 4 = almost always/always. As impulsivity is 
multi-faceted, the BIS-11 also has three second-order factors: attentional (poor 
concentration), motor (acting without thinking), and non-planning (lacking in future 
plans) impulsivity. After reviewing a number of studies utilizing the BIS-11, Stanford 
and colleagues (2009) determined that total scores less than 52 suggest an overly-
controlled or dishonest individual, 52 to 71 is considered a normal range, and scores over 
72 indicate high impulsivity. The BIS-11 has good test–retest reliability (r = 0.83; 
Stanford et al., 2009). 
 Demographic Questionnaire (see Appendix for complete questionnaire). 
Participants were asked to complete a demographic questionnaire to identify their gender, 
race, ethnicity, age, highest education level, current employment, and past criminal 
activity, including activity where respondents were not caught/arrested. Participants who 
were not fluent in English, did not meet the age requirement of being between 18 to 45 
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years old, and reported being incarcerated following a conviction were excluded from 
final analyses.
6: Statistical Analyses 
 To investigate the relationship between impulsivity, psychopathy, and risk-taking, 
an alpha level of 0.05 was utilized for all analyses. As some statistical tests required 
comparing scores from two groups, participants were split into low and high psychopathy 
(using a median split), and preliminary Chi-square analyses examined whether there were 
between-group differences based on gender, race, ethnicity, employment status, and 
education level. An independent t-test was used to compare participants’ age in the two 
psychopathy groups. Additionally, bivariate correlations were conducted between 
psychopathy and factors, risk-taking, impulsivity and factors (as the BIS-11 has three 
second-order factors that are also variables of interest), and various demographic 
characteristics to assess if a relationship exists between those variables. 
(1) Impulsive choice will significantly moderate the relationship between 
psychopathy and risk-taking. 
This hypothesis was evaluated using a hierarchical multiple regression that 
tested whether impulsive choice had a significant moderating effect on the 
relationship between continuous total psychopathy scores and average 
adjusted balloon pumps. Block 1 included psychopathy total score and 
percentage impulsive choices. Block 2 included the two-way interaction 
term for psychopathy and impulsive choice.  
(2) Impulsive action will significantly moderate the relationship between 
psychopathy and risk-taking. 
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This hypothesis was evaluated using a hierarchical multiple regression that 
tested whether impulsive action had a significant moderating effect on the 
relationship between continuous total psychopathy scores and average 
adjusted balloon pumps. Block 1 included psychopathy total score and 
mean stop-signal reaction time. Block 2 included the two-way interaction 
term for psychopathy and impulsive action.  
(3) Trait impulsivity will significantly moderate the relationship between 
psychopathy and risk-taking. 
This hypothesis was evaluated using a hierarchical multiple regression that 
tested whether trait impulsivity had a significant moderating effect on the 
relationship between continuous total psychopathy scores and average 
adjusted balloon pumps. Block 1 included psychopathy total score and 
total BIS-11 score. Block 2 included the two-way interaction term for 
psychopathy and trait impulsivity.  
(4) Risk-taking will be significantly predicted by participants’ age, gender, race, 
ethnicity, education level, employment status, impulsivity, and psychopathy. 
This hypothesis was evaluated using a stepwise multiple regression with 
age, gender, race, ethnicity, education level, employment status, total 
impulsivity score, percentage impulsive choices, mean stop-signal reaction 
time, and total psychopathy score being entered as the independent 
variables and average adjusted balloon pumps as the dependent variable. 
All the independent variables were entered into the model at the same 
time. 
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(5) There will be a positive correlation between impulsivity and secondary 
psychopathy. 
This hypothesis was evaluated using multiple Pearson bivariate 
correlations between total impulsivity scores for each of the three 
impulsivity measures and secondary psychopathy scores. 
(6) Impulsive choice will account for more variance in risk-taking than impulsive 
action. 
This hypothesis was evaluated using a multiple regression model. One 
multiple regression utilized average adjusted balloon pumps as the 
dependent variable, with percentage impulsive choices representing 
impulsive choice and mean stop-signal reaction time representing 
impulsive action as the independent variables. The standardized 
coefficient results gave an indication of which impulsivity subtype 
accounted for more variance in risk-taking.
7: Results 
7.1: Preliminary Analyses 
 Two hundred and forty five participants began the study on Amazon Mechanical 
Turk and completed the demographic questionnaire. Only 127 completed the 
demographic questionnaire and the Inquisit battery of tests, which included the SST, 
DDT, BART, BIS-11, and LSRP. Twenty three participants were removed because they 
had missing data for at least one of the measures, 2 participants were removed because 
they had endorsed being incarcerated following a conviction, 12 participants were 
removed as they entered ages higher than 45, and 1 participant was removed due to 
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duplicate data, which resulted in a final sample of 89 participants with complete data. The 
mean age of participants was 33.11 years (SD = 6.49). There were 44 males and 45 
females in the sample. Demographic characteristics of the sample are displayed in Table 
4. Those 89 participants were included in the following analyses.  
 A median split to separate participants into low and high psychopathy was used to 
determine if there were any statistically significant differences between the two groups on 
various demographic characteristics. As the LSRP does not have a cut-off score for 
psychopathy, a median split was used so no participants would have to be excluded from 
the study. An alpha level of 0.05 was used for all analyses. The median psychopathy 
score was 46, so participants who scored 45 or lower on the LSRP were in the “low 
psychopathy” group (N = 44), whereas those who scored 46 or higher were in the “high 
psychopathy” group (N = 45). Scores on the LSRP ranged from 29 to 77, with the 
maximum score being 104. 
 To compare the age of participants in the high psychopathy group to those in the 
low psychopathy group, an independent samples t-test was conducted. Levene’s test was 
not significant, so equal variances were assumed. Results indicate that there was no 
significant difference in age in low (M = 34.02, SD = 5.95) versus high (M = 32.22, SD = 
6.93) psychopathy groups (t[87] = 1.31, p = 0.19, d = 0.28). Chi-square analyses were 
used to compare participants on a variety of demographic characteristics, which included 
gender, race, education level, and employment status. Between-groups analyses revealed 
that there were no significant differences in race (χ2[5] = 3.59, p = 0.61, V = 0.20), 
ethnicity (χ2[1] = 2.96, p = 0.09, V = 0.18), employment status (χ2[3] = 0.20, p = 0.98, V 
= 0.05), and education level (χ2[3] = 6.88, p = 0.08, V = 0.28) across the high and low 
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psychopathy groups. There was a significant difference in gender (χ2[1] = 4.06, p = 0.04, 
V = 0.21) across the high and low psychopathy groups. For more information on the 
descriptive statistics of the personality and behavioral measures used in this study, see 
Tables 2 and 3.
7.2: Hypothesis Testing 
 Three hierarchical multiple regressions were conducted to determine if different 
forms of impulsivity moderate the relationship between psychopathy and risk-taking. The 
assumption of normality was violated for the dependent variable, as risk-taking was 
positively skewed, so a square root transformation was conducted. For the moderation 
analyses, the transformed dependent variable was used. 
 The first hierarchical multiple regression was performed to determine whether the 
interaction between psychopathy and impulsive choice (as measured by the DDT) 
significantly predicts risk-taking after controlling for psychopathy and impulsive choice. 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions of 
multicollinearity, normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. Two outliers were removed 
from this analysis at this time (case IDs: 2 and 50) using Cook’s distance, leverage, and 
the scatterplot of the regression leverage and the studentized deleted residuals. In the first 
step of hierarchical multiple regression, two predictors were entered: psychopathy and 
impulsive choice. This model was not statistically significant (F[2, 84] = 0.13, p = 0.88) 
and explained 0.3% of the variance in risk-taking. After entry of the interaction term at 
Step 2, the total variance explained by the model was 1.1% (F[1, 83] = 0.96, p = 0.33) 
and the overall model remained non-significant. The standardized beta weight for the 
interaction term was -0.11. 
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 The second hierarchical multiple regression was performed to determine whether 
the interaction between psychopathy and impulsive action (as measured by the SST) 
significantly predicts risk-taking after controlling for psychopathy and impulsive action. 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions of 
multicollinearity, normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. In the first step of 
hierarchical multiple regression, two predictors were entered: psychopathy and impulsive 
action. This model was not statistically significant (F[2, 86] = 0.93, p = 0.40) and 
explained 2.1% of the variance in risk-taking. After entry of the interaction term at Step 
2, the total variance explained by the model was 2.7% (F[1, 85] = 0.53, p = 0.47) and the 
overall model remained non-significant. The standardized beta weight for the interaction 
term was 0.08. 
 The third hierarchical multiple regression was performed to determine whether 
the interaction between psychopathy and self-report trait impulsivity (as measured by the 
BIS-11) significantly predicts risk-taking after controlling for psychopathy and trait 
impulsivity. Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the 
assumptions of multicollinearity, normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. Two outliers 
were removed from this analysis at this time (case IDs: 2 and 33) using Cook’s distance, 
leverage, and the scatterplot of the regression leverage and the studentized deleted 
residuals. In the first step of hierarchical multiple regression, two predictors were entered: 
psychopathy and trait impulsivity. This model was not statistically significant (F[2, 84] = 
0.28, p = 0.76) and explained 0.7% of the variance in risk-taking. After entry of the 
interaction term at Step 2, the total variance explained by the model increased to 6.3% 
(F[1, 83] = 5.59, p = 0.02), but the overall model did not significantly predict risk-taking 
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(F[3, 83] = 2.06, p = 0.11). The standardized beta weight for the interaction term was -
0.26. 
7.3: Exploratory Analyses 
 A Chi-square analysis was also conducted to determine if there were differences 
in psychopathy levels between individuals who had been arrested compared to those who 
had not. No significant difference was found (χ2[1] = 2.12, p = 0.15, V = 0.15). 
 A stepwise multiple regression using stepwise entry was conducted to evaluate 
whether participants’ age, gender, race, ethnicity, education, employment status, 
impulsivity, and psychopathy significantly predicted risk-taking. Although the dependent 
variable was non-normal, the stepwise regression was able to handle the skewed variable 
and therefore no transformations were conducted. All variables were entered at the same 
time. At step 1, gender entered into the regression equation and was significantly related 
to risk-taking, r2change = 0.07, F[1, 87] = 6.13, p = 0.02. No other independent variables 
entered into the equation at step 2 of the analysis. The standardized beta weight for 
gender was -0.26. 
 Trait impulsivity and secondary psychopathy were significantly correlated, r = 
0.69, p < 0.001. Impulsive action was not significantly correlated to secondary 
psychopathy, r = -0.20, p = 0.06, and neither was impulsive choice, r = 0.13, p = 0.23. 
Other significant correlations included those between trait impulsivity and impulsive 
choice (r = 0.26, p < 0.05), and trait impulsivity and impulsive action (r = -0.23, p < 
0.05). For a full listing of the correlations between the various measures, see Table 1. 
 A multiple regression was conducted to determine whether impulsive choice or 
impulsive action accounts for more variance in risk-taking. Although the dependent 
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variable was non-normal, the multiple regression was conducted for unique purposes – to 
assess which subset of behavioral impulsivity lends more variance in predicting risk-
taking – and not to see whether impulsive choice or impulsive action predicted risk-
taking was able to handle it and therefore no transformations were conducted. The 
independent variables, impulsive choice and impulsive action, were added into the 
regression model at the same time. The standardized beta weight for impulsive choice 
was -0.01, while the standardized beta weight for impulsive action was -0.12. 
8: Discussion 
 This study investigated whether various subsets of impulsivity – impulsive 
choice, impulsive action, and trait impulsivity – moderated the relationship between risk-
taking and psychopathy among community members. Because impulsivity is 
multidimensional, various tools measure its presence and tap into different facets of the 
construct. Therefore, it was important that multiple moderation analyses were conducted 
for the various forms of impulsivity. The findings suggest that there is little to no 
relationship between risk-taking and both psychopathy and impulsivity. Risk-taking was 
not correlated with any of the other behavioral measures, nor did it correlate to any self-
report measures. The model that aimed to predict risk-taking with psychopathy and trait 
impulsivity had a marginal increase with the addition of the interaction term, but the 
overall model was not significant. This suggests that there may be a stronger relationship 
between trait impulsivity and risk-taking than there is with risk-taking and other domains 
of impulsivity, but it is a relatively weak link. 
 Correlations only existed between self-report psychopathy and self-report 
impulsivity. However, there was no correlation between primary psychopathy 
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(represented by the LSRP primary psychopathy score) and non-planning impulsivity, 
which may suggest that the presence of this form of impulsivity may help discern 
between primary and secondary psychopathy. Non-planning impulsivity relates to 
carefully planning out tasks and thinking cautiously, which may aid those higher in 
primary psychopathy to avoid detection or possibly even avoid engaging in criminal 
activity. Additional research is necessary before this conclusion can be drawn; however, 
this finding suggests a clear difference in the manifestation of self-reported impulsivity 
between primary and secondary psychopathy as represented by the LSRP. 
 There were no significant correlations between self-report psychopathy (including 
secondary psychopathy) and the behavioral measures of impulsivity. This, along with the 
multiple correlations between psychopathy and self-report impulsivity, suggests that if 
there is impulsivity present in individuals who have psychopathic traits, it is better 
captured using a self-report impulsivity measure rather than a behavioral measure. 
Because psychopathy is a life-persistent personality disorder, it is expected that its 
manifestations of impulsivity would better be determined using a survey-based measure 
that also measures long-term impulsive behaviors rather than those that establish levels of 
impulsivity based on a short, one-time task (such as the SST and DDT). 
 Impulsive choice as measured by the DDT was positively correlated with total 
trait impulsivity and non-planning trait impulsivity, which makes sense in light of the fact 
that the DDT asks individuals to select between an impulsive option that offers a smaller 
reward or a more delayed option that gives them greater gains and has similarities to self-
report measures of impulsivity. Additionally, the relationship between behaviorally 
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measured impulsive choice and trait-based non-planning impulsivity is expected because 
the two measures tap into overlapping domains of the impulsivity construct. 
 Interestingly, the third measure for impulsivity, the SST, is purely behavioral and 
was negatively correlated with the total BIS-11 measure and the motor impulsivity factor. 
Because the SST is related to impulsive action, a positive correlation between self-
reported motor impulsivity and behavioral motor impulsivity would be expected because 
they belong to the same domain of impulsivity. However, it is possible that individuals 
who display motor impulsivity are unaware of its long-term behavioral implications and 
thus do not endorse such items on a self-report measure. 
 The only characteristic out of participants’ age, gender, race, ethnicity, education 
level, employment status, impulsivity, and psychopathy that significantly predicted risk-
taking was gender, which suggests that gender differences exist in the manifestation of 
risk-taking behaviors. Nonetheless, more research would need to be conducted on gender 
differences in psychopathic and risk-taking behaviors to substantiate such a claim. The 
findings in this study were quite similar to those by Morgan and colleagues (2011). They 
similarly found that few correlations existed between self-report psychopathy and 
behavioral measures of impulsivity. Overall, since there was a lack of significant findings 
for a majority of the hypotheses in this study, it suggests that the relationship between 
impulsivity, psychopathy, and risk-taking is not easily understood and requires further 
examination.
8.1: Limitations 
 This study had a number of limitations, one of which was that individuals were 
not pre-screened for having a minimal level of psychopathy before gaining access to this 
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study, which may have led to an overrepresentation of individuals who display very little 
or no psychopathy since the base rate of the personality disorder is around 1% among 
community members (Hare, 1999). As a low number of participants in this study were 
moderately or highly psychopathic, adding a pre-screening measure of psychopathy 
would help ensure that the individuals who were included in the study endorsed a 
minimal level of psychopathy because it is less likely that recruitment through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk would draw in many moderately or highly psychopathic individuals. 
 Moreover, this survey was administered through an online survey platform and all 
participants were anonymously recruited. If participant data had been collected in-person, 
additional measures could have been added to the test battery. Additionally, the test 
battery was administered in the same order of measures for each participant. This was 
done so that participants would first complete the most intensive measures first and 
conclude with the survey-based tests that required fewer resources; however, it is 
possible that the two behavioral impulsivity measures primed participants to think about 
their impulsive tendencies before they took the self-report impulsivity measure. 
 Additionally, participants also did not earn the monetary amounts they won in the 
tasks (particularly, the BART and the DDT). For completing the study, participants 
received $1.00 in compensation. Because they were not actually incentivized by the 
possibility of earning more money, carefully selecting the option that would maximize 
earnings was unlikely to be have been a key priority and therefore their scores may not 
have reflected the true propensity to take risks and engage in impulsive behaviors. 
Additionally, although this study was open to the community, only people who have 
Amazon Mechanical Turk accounts were able to participate. If there is a systemic 
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difference in psychopathy, impulsivity, or risk-taking levels between those who have 
MTurk accounts and those who do not, that reduces the generalizability of the study. 
8.2: Directions and Conclusions 
 This study was unique in its attempt to study the behavioral components of 
individuals who exhibit psychopathy, because the focus of primary psychopathy research 
has placed more focus on the affective traits of the individual rather than the behavioral 
aspects. Following studies should focus on obtaining a larger number of participants and 
measuring psychopathy, impulsivity, risk-taking using various measures to determine 
whether certain measures are better at detecting underlying similarities between the three 
constructs. In this study, the BART was used to measure risk-taking. Measures like the 
Risky Gains Task and the Iowa Gambling Task also assess for behavioral risk-taking. 
Adding a self-report measure of risk-taking such as the Risk Taking Questionnaire in 
future studies would also allow researchers to determine if a relationship exists between 
trait risk-taking, trait impulsivity, and psychopathy. Both self-report and behavioral 
measures of various constructs offer important and unique information about that specific 
construct that helps portray a more thorough picture of how impulsivity or risk-taking are 
exhibited. The behavioral measure for impulsive choice, the DDT, indicated whether 
participants made more (greater than 50%) impulsive choices when they were carrying 
out that task. From that, a snapshot of their impulsivity level is shown. However, by 
including the BIS, the self-report measure of impulsivity, the long-term impulsive 
tendencies of the individual can be determined. Participants with discrepant scores can be 
examined more carefully; if we had relied on only one overall measure of impulsivity, 
their impulsivity levels could have been portrayed incorrectly. Additionally, sensation 
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seeking was not examined in this study, though prior research suggests a relationship 
exists between risk-taking behaviors and sensation seeking in a sample of undergraduate 
students (Horvath & Zuckerman, 1993). 
 Community psychopathy has only in recent years begun to receive attention in 
forensic psychology research, and the majority of its focus has remained on the 
intrapersonal and affective traits of individuals who exhibit psychopathic features. This 
study was original in its attempts to operationally define and study the construct of risk-
taking along with the construct of impulsivity, including separating it into its multiple 
subsets. Replication of this study with a larger sample that focuses on recruiting 
individuals who have a sufficient level of psychopathy would aid in further understanding 
the behavioral tendencies, such as impulsivity and risk-taking, of those who present with 
primary psychopathy features.
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Appendix A: Demographic Questionnaire 
 
 
What is your age? ____________________ 
 
What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
 
What is your ethnicity? 
 Hispanic/Latino 
 Non-Hispanic/Latino 
 
What is your race? 
 American Indian/Alaskan Native 
 Asian 
 Black or African American 
 Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 
 White or Caucasian American 
 Other 
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What is the highest level of education you obtained? 
 < 12th grade 
 GED or high school diploma 
 2-year college degree 
 4-year college degree 
 Graduate degree 
 
Have you ever been arrested? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
If yes, please answer accordingly: 
Number of adult arrests ____________________ 
Number of juvenile arrests ____________________ 
Age at first arrest ____________________ 
 
Have you ever been convicted of a crime? 
 Yes 
 No 
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If yes, please answer accordingly: 
Number of felony convictions ____________________ 
Number of misdemeanor convictions ____________________ 
 
Have you ever been incarcerated following a conviction? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
If yes, please answer accordingly: 
How many times? ____________________ 
What was the longest sentence you received? ____________________ 
What was the shortest sentence you received? ____________________ 
 
Have you ever engaged in behavior that could have resulted in incarceration but you 
managed to avoid being caught? 
 Yes 
 No 
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If so, which behaviors apply: 
 Crimes against persons (e.g., murder, rape, aggravated assault, robbery) 
 Crimes against morality (e.g., selling or possessing drugs, prostitution, weapons 
possession, illegal gambling) 
 Property crimes (e.g., theft, arson, burglary, property destruction) 
 White collar crimes (e.g., embezzling, tax evasion, insider trading) 
 Other (please specify) ____________________ 
 Not Applicable 
 
What is your current employment status? 
 Full-time 
 Part-time 
 Student 
 Not employed 
 
What is your occupation? ____________________ 
 
Please list any prescription medications you are currently taking: ___________________ 
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Table 1. Correlations for personality and behavioral measures. 
 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1
0 
1. LSRP 
Total  
- - - - - - - - - - 
2. LSRP 
Factor 1  
.93*** - - - - - - - - - 
3. LSRP 
Factor 2  
.79*** .50*** - - - - - - - - 
4. BIS 
Total  
.50*** .29** .69*** - - - - - - - 
5. BIS 
Motor  
.44*** .34** .47*** .75*** - - - - - - 
6. BIS 
Attentio
nal  
.42*** .23* .59*** .75*** .34** - - - - - 
7. BIS 
Non-
planning  
.35** .14 .58*** .87*** .46*** .51*** - - - - 
8. BART -.03 -.03 -.01 .06 .13 -.05 .04 - - - 
9. DDT .06 .002 .13 .26* .08 .14 .35** .01 - - 
10. SST -.06 .04 -.20 -.23* -.22* -.15 -.18 -.12 -.19 - 
 
 
 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the LSRP  and BIS-11 personality measures. 
 
 
 
Personality measure [total possible score] Median Mean SD Min Max 
LSRP Total [104] 46 46.97 11.29 29 77 
LSRP Factor 1 [64] 27 29.21 8.05 19 50 
LSRP Factor 2 [40] 18 17.75 4.85 10 30 
BIS-11 total [120] 56 55.39 10.55 34 88 
BIS-11 Motor [44] 20 20.08 4.15 11 34 
BIS-11 Attentional [32] 14 14.3 3.82 8 25 
BIS-11 Non-planning [44] 21 21.01 5.28 11 35 
 
 
 
Note: Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale; Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the behavioral measures. 
 
 
 
Measure Median Mean SD Min Max 
BART (adjusted average balloon pumps)* 14.29 16.48 11.25 1.33 49 
DDT (percent impulsive choices) 0.47 0.45 0.29 0 1 
SST (mean stop signal reaction time)a 293.21 283.37 67.04 160.75 474.69 
 
 
 
Note: Balloon Analogue Risk Task; Delay Discounting Task; Stop Signal Task. 
a SST was measured in milliseconds. 
* The descriptives include the untransformed BART variable.  
  55 
Table 4. Demographic characteristics of sample. 
 
 
 
Variable N % 
Min 
(yrs.) 
Max 
(yrs.) 
M 
(yrs.) 
SD 
(yrs.) 
Age 89 100.0% 21 45 33.11 6.49 
Males 44  49.4% 
 
 
 
 
Females 45  50.6% 
Ethnicity 89 100.0% 
Non-Hispanic/Latino 80 89.9% 
Hispanic/Latino   9 10.1% 
Race 89 100.0% 
White/Caucasian 67  75.3% 
Asian   7  7.9% 
Black/African-American   9  10.1% 
American Indian/Alaskan 
Native 
  2  2.2% 
Native Hawaiian/Pacific 
Islander 
1  1.1% 
Other   3  3.4% 
Education (Highest Degree 
Obtained) 
89  100.0% 
Less than 12th Grade 0 0.0% 
GED or High School Diploma 21 23.6% 
2-year College Degree 14  15.7% 
4-year College Degree 40  44.9% 
Graduate Degree 14 15.7% 
Employment Status (Current) 89 100.0% 
Full-time 61 68.5% 
Part-time 19 21.3% 
Student 2 2.2% 
Not employed 7 7.9% 
Arrest History 89 100.0% 
Yes 13 14.6% 
No 76  85.4% 
  
